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Comparing Voting by Committees According 
 to Their Manipulability†
By R. Pablo Arribillaga and Jordi Massó*
We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a soci-
ety to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We 
offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees with-
out dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is 
based on the  set-inclusion relationships between the two correspond-
ing pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and 
those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation 
“to be as manipulable as” endows the set of equivalence classes 
of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a 
complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equiva-
lence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the 
quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than 
the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion 
to the full class of all voting by committees. (JEL D71, D72)
In this paper, we compare voting by committees according to their manipulability when they operate on the full domain of preference profiles, and, hence, they are 
manipulable. To do so, we apply a criterion introduced in Arribillaga and Massó 
(2016). Specifically, we consider a set of agents who have to collectively choose a 
subset from a given set of objects  K. There are many social choice problems where 
the set of social alternatives is the family of all subsets of a given set. For instance, 
when the set of agents is the tenured members of a department and the set of objects 
is the set of junior candidates under consideration to become new assistant profes-
sors or a scientific society whose current fellows have to elect new fellows from a 
given list of candidates. Voting by committees (a subclass of social choice functions 
mapping preferences profiles into subsets of  K ) have been proposed to solve this 
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class of problems. Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) a voting 
by committees is defined by specifying for each object  x ∈ K a monotonic family 
of winning coalitions   x (a committee). Then the choice of the subset of objects 
made by a voting by committees at a preference profile is done  object-by-object 
as follows. Fix a voting by committees   =  (   x ) x∈K and a preference profile, 
and consider object  x . Then,  x belongs to the chosen set (the one selected by   at 
the preference profile) if and only if the set of agents whose best subset of objects 
contains  x belongs to the committee   x . Hence, voting by committees can be seen 
as a family of extended majority voting (one for each object  x ), where the two 
alternatives at stake are whether or not  x belongs to the collectively chosen subset 
of objects.
A social choice function is  strategy-proof if it is always in the best interest of 
agents to reveal their preferences truthfully and it respects voter sovereignty if all 
subsets of objects can be chosen, for some revealed profile of agents’ preferences. 
An agent’s preferences are separable on the family of all subsets of objects  2 K if 
they are guided by the partition separating the set of objects into the set of good 
objects (as singleton sets, objects that are better than the empty set) and bad objects 
(as singleton sets, objects that are worse than the empty set). Adding a good object 
to any set leads to a better set, while adding a bad object leads to a worse set. Note 
that all additively representable preferences are separable. One of the main rea-
sons why voting by committees are attractive is that they constitute the class of all 
 strategy-proof social choice functions respecting voter sovereignty on the domain 
of separable preference profiles. So, voting by committees are attractive because 
they induce good strategic incentives to agents whenever they have separable prefer-
ences. But in addition voting by committees are appealing because they are simple.1
Agent  i is dummy at object  x in the committee   x if  i does not belong to any 
minimal winning coalition of   x ; that is,  i ’s opinion about object  x is not used at 
all in the decision of whether or not  x belongs to the chosen subset. An especially 
interesting subclass of voting by committees are those without dummy agents. And 
among the class of voting by committees without dummy agents the subclass of vot-
ing by quotas is particularly appealing. A voting by committees is a voting by quotas 
if the set of winning coalitions for each object  x are the sets of agents with equal or 
larger cardinality than a given strictly positive integer  q x , the quota of  x . Hence, in 
any voting by quotas all agents play a symmetric role when determining whether 
or not objects belong to the chosen subset. Using the main characterization result 
in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991), it is easy to see that the class of 
all anonymous and  strategy-proof social choice functions satisfying voter sover-
eignty on the domain of separable preference profiles coincides with all voting by 
quotas.
Voting by committees are simple for two reasons. First, they are  tops-only because 
they only depend on the profile of top subsets of objects, one for each agent. Second, 
they are  object-by-object decomposable, and this is precisely the reason why they 
are  strategy-proof on the domain of separable preference profiles: agent  i , when 
1 See Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) for a description of this class of problems and this axiomatic 
characterization of voting by committees. 
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considering whether or not to give support to object  x , does not need to know the 
other set of elected objects because  i wants to support  x if and only if  x is a good 
object as a singleton set (i.e.,  x belongs to  i ’s best subset of objects), since its addi-
tion improves, by separability, any subset of objects.
However, in many applications, the set of conceivable preferences of agents may 
be larger than the set of separable preferences. When adding an object to a set, 
some considerations regarding complementarities or substitutabilities among the 
added object and the objects already in the set may become relevant, yet they are 
not admissible if preferences are separable. For instance, although a voter for new 
assistant professors in the department considers that candidates  x and  y are the best 
and the second best candidates, both working in a similar research area, the voter 
may consider that, for the sake of diversity, the subset  { x, z} is better than the subset 
{ x, y, z} , where  z is a third good candidate who works in a very different area from 
the one that  x and  y work, contravening separability. For this and similar cases we 
know that  nontrivial voting by committees become manipulable, once nonseparable 
preferences are admitted in the domain where they operate. But since separable 
preferences may be conceivable too, voting by committees still have to be used to 
ensure that the social choice procedure remains  strategy-proof on the subdomain 
of separable preference profiles. But the large mechanism design literature charac-
terizing  strategy-proof social choice functions on restricted domains of preferences 
has mainly neglected the potential interest to compare two social choice functions 
(operating on the full domain of preferences) according to their manipulability. And 
this is specially relevant if the designer has some doubts on whether agents’ prefer-
ences are indeed restricted.
In Arribillaga and Massó (2016), we have already argued that the manipulability of 
a social choice function does not indicate the degree of its lack of  strategy-proofness. 
There may be only one instance at which the social choice function is manipulable 
or there may be many such instances. The mechanism design literature contains 
alternative measures (or lower and upper bounds) of the degree of manipulability to 
be applied to a given social choice function—see, for instance, Peleg (1979); Nitzan 
(1985); Kelly (1993); Smith (1999); Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken (2004); Maus, 
Peters, and Storcken (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d); Campbell and Kelly (2009); 
and Carroll (2013)—or direct criteria (in the form of partial orders) to compare 
pairs of social choice functions according to their manipulability—see, for instance, 
Pathak and Sönmez (2013); Chen et al. (2016); and Arribillaga and Massó (2016).
As in Arribillaga and Massó (2016) our criterion to compare two social choice 
functions takes the point of view of individual agents. We say that an agent is able 
to manipulate a social choice function at a preference (the true one) if there exist 
preference relations, one for each of the other agents, and another preference for the 
agent (the strategic one), such that if submitted, the social choice function selects 
a strictly better alternative according to the agent’s true preference. Consider two 
voting by committees,   and  , operating on the universal domain of preference 
profiles. Assume that for each agent the set of preferences under which the agent is 
able to manipulate   is contained in the set of preferences under which the agent is 
able to manipulate  . Then, from the point of view of all agents,   is more manipula-
ble than  . Hence, we think that   is unambiguously a better voting by committees 
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than   according to the strategic incentives induced to agents.2 Often, it may be rea-
sonable to think that agents’ preferences are separable, but if the designer foresees 
that agents also may have  non-separable preferences, then   may be a better choice 
than   if strategic incentives are relevant and important to the designer.
Before presenting our general result in Theorem 2, we focus on voting by com-
mittees without dummy agents. In Theorem 1, we provide a simple necessary and 
sufficient condition for the comparability of two voting by committees without 
dummy agents in terms of their manipulability. This condition reflects the power 
of agents to influence the choice of the objects in the two voting by commit-
tees. Two notions are relevant to describe this power. Fix a voting by committees 
  =  (   x ) x∈K , an agent  i , and an object  x. We say that agent  i is decisive at  x if the 
singleton set  { i} belongs to   x ; that is,  { i} is a winning coalition of  x and, hence,  i 
can impose object  x in the final chosen subset by voting for  x (i.e., by declaring that 
x belongs to  i ’s top subset of objects). We say that agent  i is vetoer at  x if  i belongs 
to all winning coalitions of   x ; that is,  i can make sure that  x is not in the final 
chosen subset by not voting for  x (i.e., by declaring that  x does not belong to  i ’s top 
subset of objects). Then, the voting by committees without dummy agents   is more 
manipulable than the voting by committees without dummy agents   if and only 
if, for each agent, the decisive and vetoer sets of objects at   are contained, respec-
tively, in the decisive and vetoer sets of objects at   . Given the binary relation “to 
be as manipulable as” defined on the family of voting by committees we construct 
the set of equivalence classes of voting by committees, relative to this binary rela-
tion, by grouping together the voting by committees that are equally manipulable 
to each other, and extend this relation to the quotient set of equivalence classes in 
the natural way. Then we show that, when the number of agents  n is greater than 
or equal to three, the binary relation “to be at least as manipulable as” defined on 
the family of equivalence classes of voting by quotas (i.e., anonymous voting by 
committees) is a complete upper semilattice, whose maximal element is the equiva-
lence class containing all voting by quotas where all quotas are strictly larger than 1 
and strictly smaller than  n . On the other hand, the equivalence classes of voting by 
quotas that are not more manipulable than any other equivalence class of voting by 
quotas are those where all objects have either quota 1 or quota  n . We also identify, in 
Proposition 2, among all voting by committees without dummies (a larger set than 
the set of voting by quotas) those that are less manipulable. They can be character-
ized by two properties. First, the set of objects at which each agent is decisive con-
tains the set of objects at which all agents are not vetoers. Second, the set of objects 
at which each agent is not a vetoer is contained in the set of objects at which some 
agent is decisive. In Theorem 2, we give the necessary and sufficient condition for 
2 Pathak and Sönmez (2013) proposed two comparability criteria based on the inclusion of sets of preference 
profiles and use them to compare two different matching mechanisms (in school choice problems) according to 
their manipulability. In contrast, our notion is based on the inclusion of sets of preference relations at which an 
agent is able to manipulate. In applications, preference profiles are not common knowledge while each agent 
knows his preference relation. A more manipulable social choice function requires that each agent has to worry 
about his potential capacity to manipulate in a larger set. In a remark at the end of the paper we present the two 
Pathak and Sönmez (2013) criteria and relate them to our comparability criterion. Chen et al. (2016) proposed an 
 agent-by-agent comparability criterion to compare stable matching mechanisms based on the inclusion of sets of 
alternatives that represent an improvement that an agent, at a preference profile, can obtain by misreporting. 
78 AMEricAN EcoNoMic JourNAL: MicroEcoNoMics NoVEMBEr 2017
the  comparability according to their manipulability of two voting by committees, 
potentially with dummy agents. The condition is more involved than the one used to 
compare voting by committees without dummy agents, and it incorporates, in addi-
tion to the inclusion of sets of objects at which each agent is decisive and vetoer, the 
inclusion of sets of objects at which each agent is a dummy. However, the inclusions 
of the three sets of objects are not necessary, but we show that they may not hold 
only in two very special circumstances, that we fully identify.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I contains preliminary notation and defi-
nitions. Separable preferences and voting by committees are defined in Section II. 
Section III presents preliminary results. Section IV compares voting by committees 
without dummy agents and Theorem 2 in Section V provides the complete criterion 
to compare any pair of voting by committees. Section VI relates our comparability 
criterion with the two criteria proposed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013).
I. Preliminaries
Agents are the elements of a finite set  N = { 1, … , n}. The set of objects is a 
finite set  K . Generic agents will be denoted by  i and  j and generic objects by  x and 
y . Subsets of agents will be represented by  s and  T and subsets of objects by  A and 
B. The set of agents  N has to choose a subset of  K. Hence, the set of alternatives 
is the family  2 K of all subsets of objects. Given  s ⊆ N and  A ∈  2 K , we denote by 
 |s| and  |A| their cardinalities and by  _ s and  _ A their complementary sets. We assume 
that  |N | = n ≥ 2 and  |K | ≥ 2 .
The (strict) preference of each agent  i ∈ N is a linear order  P i on the set of alter-
natives; namely,  P i is a complete, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation on 
 2 K . As usual, let  r i denote the weak preference relation induced by  P i ; namely, for 
all  A, B ∈  2 K ,  A r i B if and only if either  A P iB or  A = B . The top alternative accord-
ing to  P i is the most preferred alternative and we denote it by  t( P i) ; i.e.,  t( P i)  P iA 
for all  A ∈  2 K \ { t( P i )} . Let   be the set of all preferences. A preference profile 
 P = ( P 1 , … ,  P n ) ∈   n is an  n -tuple of preferences, one for each agent. To empha-
size the role of agent  i a preference profile  P will be represented by  ( P i ,  P −i ) .
A Cartesian product subset   ˆ  n ⊆    n of preference profiles (or the set   ˆ itself) 
will be called a domain. A social choice function is a function  f :   ˆ  n →  2 K select-
ing, for each preference profile  P in the domain   ˆ  n , a subset of objects  f (P) ∈  2 K .
A social choice function  f :   ˆ n →  2 K satisfies voter sovereignty if for all  A ∈  2 K 
there exists a profile  P ∈   ˆ  n such that  f (P) = A ; namely,  f is onto.
A social choice function  f :   ˆ  n →  2 K is  tops-only if for all  P,  P ′ ∈   ˆ  n such that 
t( P i ) = t( P i ′ ) for all  i ∈ N,  f (P) = f ( P ′ ) .
A social choice function requires that each agent reports a preference on a domain 
 ˆ . A social choice function is  strategy-proof on   ˆ  n if it is always in the best interest 
of agents to reveal their preferences truthfully. Formally, a social choice function 
f :   ˆ  n →  2 K is  strategy-proof if for all  P ∈   ˆ  n , all  i ∈ N , and all  P i ′ ∈   ˆ ,
(1)  f ( P i ,  P −i )  r i  f ( P i ′ ,  P −i ). 
VoL. 9 No. 4 79arribillaga and massó: Comparing Voting by Committees
That is, a social choice function  f :   ˆ  n →  2 K is  strategy-proof (on the domain   ˆ  n ) 
if, for each preference profile  P ∈   ˆ  n and each agent,  truth-telling is a weakly dom-
inant strategy in the normal form game induced by  f at  P. We will say that a social 
choice function  f :   ˆ  n →  2 K is not manipulable by  i ∈ N at  P i ∈   ˆ if (1) holds for 
all  ( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∈   ˆ  n . To compare social choice functions according to their manipu-
lability, our reference set of preferences will be the full set   .
The set of manipulable preferences of  i ∈ N at  f :   n →  2 K is given by
    i f = {  P i ∈  |  f (  P i ′ ,  P −i )  P i f (  P i ,  P −i ) for some ( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∈   n }. 
Obviously, a social choice function  f :   n →  2 K is  strategy-proof if and only 
if    i f = { ∅ } for all  i ∈ N . We say that  f :   n →  2 K is more manipulable than 
 g :   n →  2 K for  i ∈ N if   i g ⊊    i f . 
Now, we introduce our criteria to compare social choice functions according to 
their manipulability.
DEFINITION 1: A social choice function  f :    n →  2 K is at least as manipulable as 
social choice function  g :   n →  2 K if   i g ⊆    i f for all  i ∈ N. 
DEFINITION 2: A social choice function  f :   n →  2 K is equally manipulable as 
social choice function  g :   n →  2 K if  f is at least as manipulable as  g and vice 
versa; i.e.,   i g =    i f for all  i ∈ N. 
DEFINITION 3: A social choice function  f :   n →  2 K is more manipulable than 
social choice function  g :   n →  2 K if  f is at least as but not equally manipulable as 
social choice function  g ; i.e.,   i g ⊆    i f for all  i ∈ N and there exists  j ∈ N such 
that   j g ⊊    j f . 
Given two social choice functions  f :   n →  2 K and  g :   n →  2 K , we write (i) 
f ≿ g to denote that  f is at least as manipulable as  g , (ii)  f ≈ g to denote that  f is 
equally manipulable as  g , and (iii)  f ≻ g to denote that  f is more manipulable than  g. 
Obviously, there are many pairs of social choice functions that cannot be compared 
according to their manipulability.
II. Separable Preferences and Voting by Committees
Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) characterizes, on the restricted domain 
of separable preferences, the family of all  strategy-proof social choice functions 
satisfying voter sovereignty as the class of voting by committees. A preference  P i is 
separable if the division between good objects ( x is a good object if  { x}  P i { ∅ } ) and 
bad objects ( x is a bad object if  { ∅ }  P i { x} ) guides the ordering of (some) subsets in 
the sense that adding a good object to any set leads to a better set, while adding a bad 
object to any leads to a worse set. Formally,
DEFINITION 4: A preference  P i ∈  on  2 K is separable if for all  A ∈  2 K and  x ∉ A ,
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  A ∪ { x}  P i A if and only if { x}  P i { ∅ }. 
Let   be the set of all separable preferences on  2 K . Observe that for any separable 
preference its top is the subset of good objects. That is, for any separable preference 
P i ∈ , 
  t(  P i ) = { x ∈ K |  { x}  P i { ∅ }}. 
The following remark characterizes separable preferences. It follows from transi-
tivity of the preference and it says that if we modify any given set of objects  A by 
removing good objects and adding bad objects, the new set is less preferred.
REMARK 1: A preference  P i is separable if and only if for all  A ∈  2 K , 
 T 1 ⊂ t(  P i ) ∩ A , and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t(  P i ) ∩  _ A ,
  A r i (A\ T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . 
We now define the class of social choice functions known as voting by commit-
tees. Let  x ∈ K be an object. A committee   x for  x is a  nonempty set of  nonempty 
coalitions (subsets) of  N , which satisfies the following monotonicity condition:
  if M ∈   x  and M ⊂  M ′ , then  M ′ ∈   x . 
A social choice function  f :    n →  2 K is a voting by committees if for each 
 x ∈ K there exists a committee   x , such that for all  P ∈   n ,
(2)  x ∈ f (P )  if and only if { i ∈ N | x ∈ t(  P i )} ∈   x . 
Observe that voting by committees are very simple. They are  tops-only and the 
selected subset of objects at each preference profile is obtained in a decomposable 
way,  object-by-object. Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) characterizes this 
class when they operate on the restricted domain of separable preferences as follows.
PROPOSITION 1 (Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou 1991): A social choice func-
tion  f :   n →  2 K is  strategy-proof and satisfies voter sovereignty if and only if it is 
voting by committees.
III. Preliminary Results
Let   x be a committee for object  x ∈ K. The subset of agents  M ∈   x is a min-
imal winning coalition on   x if there is no  M ′ ∈   x , such that  M ′ ⊊  M. Given a 
committee   x , we denote by   x m , the set of its minimal winning coalitions.
Assume  f :    n →  2 K is a voting by committees and let   =  (   x ) x∈K be its 
associated family of committees, one for each object. Abusing notation we will 
often write  f directly as   :    n →  2 K ; hence, for  P ∈   n ,  (P ) will denote the 
subset of objects chosen by the voting by committees   at  P. 
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Let   be a voting by committees. We define three different notions of power 
that agents may have at   with respect to their role on the choice of the subset of 
objects. These notions will be relevant to compare voting by committees according 
to their manipulability.
First, agent  i is dummy at  x if  i does not belong to any minimal winning coalition 
on   x ; hence,  i does not play any role on the choice of whether or not  x belongs 
to the chosen set of objects according to  . The set of objects at which agent  i is 
dummy, given   , is defined as
  D u i  = { x ∈ K | for all s ∈   x m , i ∉ s}. 
We say that a voting by committees   :   n →  2 K has no dummies if, for all 
 i ∈ N,  D u i  = { ∅ }. Without loss of generality we assume that no agent is dummy at 
all objects. That is, for all  i ∈ N, 
(3)  D u i  ≠ K;  
otherwise if  D u i  = K, then   i  = { ∅ } and therefore we may proceed by setting 
N := N \ { i} .
Second, agent  i is decisive at  x if  i , as a singleton set, belongs to   x ; hence,  i can 
impose object  x in the chosen subset by declaring it as an element in the top subset 
of objects. The set of objects at which agent  i is decisive, given   , is defined as
  D e i  = { x ∈ K |  { i} ∈   x }. 
Third, agent  i is a vetoer at  x if  i belongs to all coalitions on   x ; hence,  i can veto 
object  x by not declaring it as an element in the top subset of objects. The set of 
objects at which agent  i is vetoer, given   , is defined as
  V e i  = { x ∈ K | i ∈  ∩ s∈  x  s}. 
Example 1 illustrates how voting by committees work and the three notions of 
power.
Example 1: Let  N = { 1, 2, 3, 4} be the set of agents and  K = { x, y, z, w} be the set 
of objects. Consider the voting by committees   defined by the following (mini-
mal) committees:
   x m =  { s ⊂ N |  |s| = 2},
   y m =  { { 1, 2},  { 2, 3}},
   z m =  { { 1, 2, 3, 4}},  and
   w m =  { { 1},  { 4}}. 
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Take any pair of preference profiles  P,  P ′ ∈   4 with the properties that
  t( P 1 ) =  { x, y},  t( P 2 ) = { y, w},  t( P 3 ) = { x, y},  and t( P 4 ) = { y, z, w} and
 t( P 1 ′ ) =  { y},  t( P 2 ′ ) = { z, w},  t(  P 3 ′ ) = { y, z},  and t(  P 4 ′ ) = { w}. 
Then,  (P)  = { x, y, w} and  ( P ′ ) = { w}. Observe that the sets related with the 
power of the agents at   are
  D u 1  =  { ∅ },  D u 2  = { w},  D u 3  = { w}, and D u 4  = { y},
 D e 1  =  { w},  D e 2  = { ∅ },  D e 3  = { ∅ }, and D e 4  = { w},  and
 V e 1  =  { z},  V e 2  = { y, z},  V e 3  = { z}, and V e 4  = { z}.  
Our first preliminary result states that agent  i cannot affect the choice of the 
objects at which  i is a dummy agent.
LEMMA 1: Let   :   n →  2 K be a voting by committees. Then, for all  ( P i ,  P −i ) ∈   n 
and  P i ′ ∈ , 
  ( P i ,  P −i ) ∩ D u i  = (  P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∩ D u i  . 
PROOF:
Fix  P −i ∈   n−1 . It will be sufficient to show that, for any pair  P i ,  P i ′ ∈  , 
 ( P i ,  P −i ) ∩ D u i  ⊂ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ). Assume  x ∈ ( P i ,  P −i ) ∩ D u i  . Then, there 
exists  s ∈    x m such that  x ∈ t( P j ) for all  j ∈ s. Since    x ∈ D u i  ,  i ∉ s. Thus, 
x ∈ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ).  ∎ 
The comparability between two voting by committees in terms of their manipula-
bility will relay strongly on the inclusion relationship between the two induced sets 
of alternatives that may be selected by them, once the preference of a fixed agent  i 
is given.
DEFINITION 5: Let  f  :    n →  2 K be a social choice function and let  P i ∈  . The 
set of options left open by  P i ∈  at  f is defined as follows:
  o f ( P i ) = { A ∈  2 K | f ( P i ,  P −i ) = A for some   P −i ∈   n−1 }. 
Given two subsets of objects  A, B ∈  2 K , such that  A ⊂ B , let  [ A, B ] be the family 
of all subsets of objects that can be obtained from  A by adding to it objects in  B \ A. 
Namely, for any pair of alternatives  A ⊂ B ⊂ K ,
  [ A, B ] = { c ⊂ K | A ⊂ c ⊂ B}. 
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Although imperfectly, to obtain an intuitive geometric idea, the set  [ A, B ] can be 
seen as the elements in the cone lying between  A and  B, where  [ { ∅ },  2 K ] would be 
the cone containing all subsets of  K (see Figure 1).
Lemma 2 characterizes the set of options left open by  P i at   in terms of 
 t( P i ) and the sets of objects at which  i is decisive and no vetoer. This result plays a 
crucial role in the sequel and it will be intensively used. The intuition why it holds 
is as follows. Fix a preference  P i ∈ . First, any subset of objects belonging to the 
set of options left open by  P i has to contain the objects in  t( P i) for which  i is simulta-
neously decisive at them; this is so because agent  i has voted for them and  i has the 
power to include them. Second, any subset of objects in the set of options left open 
by  P i has to be contained in the set made by the union of the set of objects in  t( P i ) 
and the subset of objects at which  i is not a vetoer; this is so because any object for 
which agent  i has not voted for and simultaneously  i is a vetoer at will never belong 
to the chosen subset of objects. Moreover, any subset of objects that does satisfy the 
two conditions above will belong to the set of option left open by  P i at   because, 
whenever all remaining agents declare this set as their top subset of objects, it will 
be selected by   since the vote of  i is not required (because  i is not a vetoer) against 
the unanimous vote of the remaining set of agents. Figure 2 illustrates the set of 
options left open by  P i at   .
LEMMA 2: Let   :   n →  2 K be a voting by committees . Then, for all  P i ∈ , 
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PROOF:
Assume  A ∈  o  ( P i ). Then, there exists  P −i ∈   n−1 , such that  A = ( P i ,  P −i ). 
Let  x ∈ t( P i ) ∩ D e i  . Then,  x ∈ t( P i ) and  { i} ∈   x . Hence,  x ∈ ( P i ,  P −i ) = A. 
Thus,  t( P i ) ∩ D e i  ⊂ A. Let  x ∈ A and assume that  x ∉ t( P i ). We will prove that 
x ∈  ‾ V  e i   . Since  x ∈ ( P i ,  P −i ) and  x ∉ t( P i ), there exists  s ∈   x m such that 
s ⊂ { j ∈ N | x ∈ t( r j )} and  i ∉ s. Hence,  x ∈  ‾ V  e i   . Thus,  A ⊂ t( P i ) ∪  ‾ V  e i   . 
Now, let  A ∈   [t( P i ) ∩ D e i  , t( P i ) ∪  ‾ V  e i   ] . For each  j ∈ N \ { i}, let  P j be any 
preference such that  t( P j ) = A . We will prove that  ( P i ,  P −i ) = A. To prove one 
of the two inclusions, assume  x ∈ A. If  x ∈ t( P i ), then  {  j ∈ N | x ∈ t( P j )} = N. 
Hence,  x ∈ ( P i ,  P −i ). If  x ∉ t( P i ), then  x ∈  ‾ V  e i   (since  A ⊂ t( P i ) ∪  ‾ V  e i   ). 
Hence,  {  j ∈ N | x ∈ t( P j )} = N \ { i} ∈   x and  x ∈ ( P i ,  P −i ). To prove the other 
inclusion, assume  x ∈ ( P i ,  P −i ). By the definition of  t( P j), either  x ∈ A or else 
x ∈ t( P i )\ A and  { i} ∈   x . Hence, either  x ∈ A or else  x ∈ t( P i ) ∩ D e i  . Thus, since 
by assumption  t( P i ) ∩ D e i  ⊂ A ,  x ∈ A.  ∎ 
In light of Lemma 2, it is easy to see that as the decisive and vetoer sets of objects 
become larger the option set left open by a preference becomes smaller. Figure 3 
illustrates this statement and Lemma 3 states it formally.
LEMMA 3: Let   :   n →  2 K and   :   n →  2 K be two voting by committees with the 
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PROOF:
It follows immediately from Lemma 2.  ∎ 
In the last preliminary result of this section, we identify the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions under which a voting by committees   is not manipulable by agent 
i at a particular preference  P i . These conditions can be seen as a weakening of the 
separability conditions because they require to compare in a specific way fewer 
pairs of subsets of objects. These pairs are composed of two kinds of sets. First, any 
subset  A that is selected by   when  i votes for  t( P i ) (i.e.,  A ∈  o  ( P i ) ). Second, 
any subset that can be obtained from  A by taking out objects in  t( P i ) at which  i is 
not a dummy and by simultaneously adding objects not in  A that are in  ‾ t(  P i ) and 
at which  i is not a dummy. Lemma 4 can be seen as providing a general maximal 
domain result for all voting by committees, which depends on the sets of decisive, 
vetoers and dummy objects of agent  i at   .3 Figure 4 illustrates a particular pair of 
distinct subsets ( A and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ) in the cone  [ { ∅ },  2 K ] that have to be compara-
ble by  P i (i.e.,  A P i (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ) to ensure that   is not manipulable by  i at  P i .
3 See Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1999); Barberà, Sonnesnchein, and Zhou (1991); and Serizawa (1995) for 
related results identifying maximal domains of preferences under which voting by committees remain  strategy-proof. 
The results on the second and third papers are less general since they apply only to voting by committees without 
vetoer and dummy agents or without dummy agents, respectively. The results in the first paper are presented in the 
different setting of multidimensional generalized median voters schemes and hence, they are stated in terms of left 




















86 AMEricAN EcoNoMic JourNAL: MicroEcoNoMics NoVEMBEr 2017
LEMMA 4: Let   :   n →  2 K be a voting by committees . Then,   is not  manipulable 
by  i ∈ N at  P i ∈  if and only if for all  A ∈  o  ( P i ) ,  T 1 ⊂ t( r i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i   , 
and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( r i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i   ,
  A r i (A\ T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . 
PROOF:
 ⇒ ) Consider any  P i ∈  at which   is not manipulable by  i ∈ N and let 
 A ∈  o  ( P i ) ,  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D  u i   , and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D  u i   be arbitrary. 
Then, there exists  P −i ∈   n−1 such that
  ( P i ,  P −i ) = A. 
Since  T 1 ∪  T 2 ⊂  ‾ D u i   , for each  x ∈  T 1 ∪  T 2 there is  s x i ∈    x m such that  i ∈  s x i. For 
each  j ∈ N \ { i}, consider any  P j ′ ∈  such that
(4)  t( P j ′ ) = (t( P j )\ { x ∈  T 1 ∪  T 2 | j ∉  s x i } )  ∪ { x ∈  T 1 ∪  T 2 | j ∈  s x i },  
and let  P i ′ ∈  be any preference with the property that
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Claim 1:  (  P i ,  P −i ′ ) = A and  ( P i ′ ,  P −i ′ ) = (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . 
PROOF OF CLAIM 1:
We first show that  ( P i ,  P −i ′ ) = A. Assume  x ∈  T 2 . By (4) , 
 {  j ∈ N \ { i} | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} =  s x i \ { i}. Hence, and since  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t(  P i ) ,  x ∉ t( P i ). Observe 
that  i ∈  s x i ∈   x m implies  s x i \ { i} ∉   x . Thus,  x ∉ ( P i ,  P −i ′ ). Therefore,
(5)  ( P i ,  P −i ′ ) ∩  T 2 = { ∅ }. 
Assume  x ∈  T 1 . By (4),  {  j ∈ N \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} =  s x i \ { i}. Furthermore, as 
 T 1 ⊂ t( P i ),  x ∈ t( r i ). Observe that  s x i ∈   x m . Thus,  x ∈ ( P i ,  P −i ′ ). Therefore,
(6)  ( P i ,  P −i ′ ) ∩  T 1 =  T 1 . 
Assume  x ∉  T 1 ∪  T 2 . By (4),  {  j ∈ N \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} = { j ∈ N \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j )}. 
Hence,
(7)  ( ‾  T 1 ∪  T 2) ∩ ( P i ,  P −i ′ ) = ( ‾  T 1 ∪  T 2) ∩ ( P i ,  P −i ). 
By (5), (6), and (7),
        ( P i ,  P −i ′ ) = [ ( ‾  T 1 ∪  T 2) ∩ (  P i ,  P −i ′ ) ] ∪  T 1 
 = [( ‾  T 1 ∪  T 2) ∩ (  P i ,  P −i ) ] ∪  T 1 
 = [ ( ‾  T 1 ∪  T 2) ∩ A ] ∪  T 1 
 = A, 
where the last equality follows from the facts that  T 1 ⊂ A and  T 2 ⊂  _ A . 
We now show that  ( P i ′ ,  P −i ′ ) = (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . Assume  x ∈ A\  T 1 . If  x ∈ t( P i ), 
and since  ( P i ,  P −i ′ ) = A,  { j ∈ N \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} ∪ { i} ∈   x holds. If  x ∉ t(  P i ), 
and since  ( P i ,  P −i ′ ) = A,  {  j ∈ N \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} ∈   x holds. Hence, in both 
cases,
(8)  {  j ∈ N  \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} ∪ { i} ∈   x . 
Since  x ∈ t( P i ′ ),  {  j ∈ N  \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} ∪ { i} = {   j ∈ N | x ∈ t( P j ′ )}. Hence, by (8),  {  j ∈ N | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} ∈   x . Thus,  x ∈ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ′ ). Assume now  x ∈  T 2 . By (4),  {  j ∈ N \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} =  s x i \ { i}. Hence, and since  x ∈ t( P i ′ ),  x ∈ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ′ ). 
Therefore, we have showed that  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ⊂ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ′ ). To show that the other 
inclusion holds, assume  x ∈ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ′ ). If  x ∈ t( P i ′ ), by the definition of  t( P i ′ ), 
x ∈ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . If, on the other hand,  x ∉ t(  P i ′ ) ,
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(9)  {  j ∈ N | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} = {  j ∈ N  \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j ′ )}. 
Hence, and since  x ∈ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ′ ), by (9),  x ∈ ( P i ,  P −i ′ ) = A. Now, to obtain 
a contradiction assume  x ∈  T 1 . Hence,  {   j ∈ N  \ { i}  | x ∈ t( P j ′ )} =  s x i \ { i} and 
 x ∉ t( P i ′ ). Therefore,  x ∉ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ′ ) which is a contradiction. Thus,  x ∈ A\  T 1 .  ∎ 
Therefore, by Claim 1 and the fact that   is not manipulable by  i at  P i , 
  A r i (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . 
 ⇐ ) Let  P i ∈  be arbitrary and assume that for all  A ∈  o  ( P i ) , 
 T 1 ⊂ t(  r i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i   , and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t(  r i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i   ,  A r i (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 holds. We 
will show that, for all  ( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∈   n , 
  ( P i ,  P −i )  r i ( P i ′ ,  P −i ). 
Assume  ( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∈   n and let  ( P i ,  P −i ) = A ∈  o  ( P i ),  T 1 = (A\( P i ′ ,  P −i )) 
∩  ‾ D u i   , and  T 2 = (( P i ′ ,  P −i )\ A)  ∩  ‾ D u i   . Then,
 (A\ T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = [(A ∩ D u i  ∪ A ∩  ‾ D u i   )\ T 1 ] ∪  T 2 
 = (A ∩ D u i  ) ∪ [(A ∩  ‾ D u i   )\ T 1 ] ∪  T 2 since  T 1 ⊂  ‾ D u i 
 = (A ∩ D u i  ) ∪ [(A ∩  ‾ D u i   ) ∩  _  T 1] ∪  T 2 
 = (A ∩ D u i  ) ∪ [(A ∩  ‾ D u i   ) ∩ ( _ A ∪ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∪ D u i  ) ] ∪  T 2 
 = (A ∩ D u i  ) ∪ [(A ∩  ‾ D u i   ) ∩ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ] ∪  T 2 
 = (A ∩ D u i  ) ∪ [(A ∩  ‾ D u i   ) ∩ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ] 
  ∪ (( P i ′ ,  P −i )\ A) ∩  ‾ D u i   )
 = (A ∩ D u i  ) ∪ [ (A ∩ ( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∪ (( P i ′ ,  P −i )\ A)] ∩  ‾ D u i   
 = (A ∩ D u i  ) ∪ (( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∩  ‾ D u i   )
 = (( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∩ D u i  ) ∪ (( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ∩  ‾ D u i   ) by Lemma 1
 = ( P i ′ ,  P −i ). 
Furthermore,  T 1 ⊂ t( r i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i   and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( r i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i   since 
 A\( P i ′ ,  P −i ) ⊂ t( r i ) and  ( P i ′ ,  P −i )\ A ⊂  ‾ t(  P i ) . Thus, by hypothesis,
  ( P i ,  P −i ) = A r i (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = ( P i ′ ,  P −i ). ∎
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IV. Comparing Voting by Committees without Dummies
A. Main result without Dummies
Theorem 1 gives an easy and operative way to compare voting by committees 
without dummies according to their manipulability. A voting by committees   is at 
least as manipulable as voting by committees   if and only if, for each agent  i ∈ N , 
the sets of objects at which agent  i is decisive and vetoer in   is each contained in the 
corresponding sets in   . The results in the preceding lemmata are key to understand 
this characterization. Larger decisive and vetoer sets of objects make the option 
sets left open smaller and this leaves more freedom on the comparability between 
subsets of objects, reducing, hence, the set of preferences under which the agent is 
able to manipulate.
THEOREM 1: Let   :   n →  2 K and   :   n →  2 K be two voting by committees 
without dummies. Then,   ≿  if and only if, for all  i ∈ N ,  D e i  ⊂ D e i  and 
 V e i  ⊂ V e i  . 
PROOF:
 ⇐ ) To prove sufficiency, assume that for all  i ∈ N,  D e i  ⊂ D e i  and 
 V e i  ⊂ V e i  . We prove that   ≿  by showing that, for all  i ∈ N,   i  ⊂   i  . 
Suppose  P i ∈   i  . Observe that since   and   have no dummies,  ‾ D u i   =  ‾ D u i  = K holds. Then, by Lemma 4, there exist  A ∈  o  ( P i ) ,  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A , and 
 T 2 ⊂  ‾ t(  P i ) ∩  _ A such that
  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2  P i A. 
By Lemma 3,  o  ( P i ) ⊂  o  ( P i ). Hence,  A ∈  o  ( P i ). Thus, by Lemma 4, 
 P i ∈   i  . Therefore,   is at least as manipulable as  . 
 ⇒ ) To prove necessity assume that   is at least as manipulable as  . Hence, for 
all  i ∈ N ,
(10)   i  ⊂   i  . 
Assume, to obtain a contradiction, that there exists  x ∈ K such that  x ∈ V e i  \V e i  
or  x ∈ D e i  \D e i  . We distinguish between these two cases.
Case 1: There exists  x ∈ V  e i  \V  e i  . Consider any  P i ′ ∈  such that  t(  P i ′ ) = { ∅ } 
satisfying in addition the following properties:
  (i) B P i ′c P i ′ { x} if x ∉ B and x ∈ c,
 (ii) A r i ′B if A ⊂ B and x ∉ B. 
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Three comments on the preference  P i ′ are appropriate. First, such preference exists 
and, because we assumed that  |K | ≥ 2 , there exists  c ⊂ K such that  x ∈ c and 
{ x} ≠ c. Second, any pair of subsets of objects that are unrestricted by conditions 
(i) and (ii) can be ordered arbitrarily by  P i ′ . Third,  P i ′ is not separable since  K P i ′ { x} 
while all objects are bad.
Since  x ∈ V e i  \V e i  ,  { x} ∈  o  ( P i ′ ). Set  A = { x},  T 1 = { ∅ } , and  T 2 = c\ { x} 
where  c is such that  x ∈ c and  { x} ≠ c (which exists because  |K | ≥ 2 ). Observe 
first that  A ∈  o  ( P i ′ ) and, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′,  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = c P i ′ { x} = A. 
Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′ ∈   i  . Second, take any  B ∈  o  ( P i ′ ). Since  x ∈ V e i  
and  x ∉ t( P i ′ ),  x ∉ B. Let  T 2 ⊂  _ A be arbitrary. By (i) and (ii) in the definition of 
 P i ′,  B r i ′B ∪  T 2 . Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′ ∉   i  . Thus,  P i ′ ∈   i  \  i  holds, which 
contradicts (10).
Case 2: There exists  x ∈ D e i  \D e i  . Consider any  P i ′′ ∈   i  such that 
 t( P i ′′ ) = K satisfying in addition the following properties:
  (i) B P i ′′ c P i ′′ K \ { x} if x ∈ B and x ∉ c,
 (ii) A r i ′′ B if B ⊂ A and x ∈ B. 
Three comments on the preference  P i ′′ are also appropriate. First, such preference 
exists and, because we assumed that  |K | ≥ 2 , there exists  c ⊂ K , such that  x ∉ c 
and  c ≠ { ∅ }. Second, any pair of subsets of objects that are unrestricted by condi-
tions (i) and (ii) can be ordered arbitrarily by  P i ′′ . Third,  P i ′′ is not separable since 
 { ∅ } P i ′′ K \ { x} while all objects are good.
Since  x ∈ D e i  \D e i  ,  K \ { x} ∈  o  ( P i ′′ ). Set first  A = K \ { x},  T 2 = { ∅ } , and 
T 1 = c , where  c is such that  x ∉ c and  c ≠ { ∅ }. Observe that  A ∈  o  ( P i ′′ ) , 
 x ∉ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 , and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ≠ { ∅ }. Then, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′ , 
 (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 P i ′′ K \ { x} = A. Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′′ ∈   i  . Second, take any 
 B ∈  o  ( P i ′′ ). Since  x ∈ D e i  and  x ∈ t( P i ′′ ),  x ∈ B. Let  T 1 ⊂ B be arbitrary. By (i) 
and (ii) in the definition of  P i ′′ ,  B r i ′′ B\  T 1 . Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′′ ∉   i  . Thus, 
 P i ′′ ∈   i  \  i  holds, which contradicts (10).  ∎ 
Next proposition identifies those voting by committees without dummies that 
are less manipulable. They have the properties that (i) the set of objects at which 
all agents are not vetoers is a subset of the set of decisive objects of each agent, and 
(ii) the set of objects at which each agent is not a vetoer is contained in the set of 
objects at which some agent is decisive. But before stating Proposition 2 we present 
a simple remark that will be used in its proof.
REMARK 2: Assume   :   n →  2 K is a voting by committees without dummies. 
Then, for all  i ∈ N ,  D e i  ⊂  ‾ V e i   . 
To see why Remark 2 holds, assume there exists  x ∈ D e i  such that  x ∈ V e i  . 
Then,   x m = { { i}} . Hence, each  j ≠ i is a dummy at  x , which is a contradiction.
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PROPOSITION 2: Let   :   n →  2 K be a voting by committees without dummies . 
Then, there does not exist a voting by committee without dummies   :   n →  2 K 
such that   ≻  if and only if
(11)  ∩ i∈N ‾ V e i   ⊂ D e j  for all j ∈ N,  
(12)  ‾ V e j   ⊂  ∪ i∈N D e i  for all j ∈ N. 
PROOF:
 ⇒ ) We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: There exist  j ∈ N and  x ∈ K such that  x ∈  ∩ i∈N ‾ V e i   and  x ∉ D e j  . 
Define   as follows:
Since  x ∉ D e j  and   does not have dummies,  { ∅ } ∉ { s\ { j} ⊂ N | s ∈   x m such 
that  j ∈ s} and   is a well-defined voting by committees. Now, we prove that   is a 
voting by committees without dummies. For each object  y ≠ x , it is immediate to 
see that   y has no dummies since   y does not have any. We prove that no agent is 
a dummy at  x at   . Let  i ∈ N. If  i = j, it is immediate to see that  i is not dummy at 
x since  { i} ∈   x m by definition. If  i ≠ j, there exists  s ∈   x m such that  i ∈ s (since  is a voting by committees without dummies). Hence,  s\ {  j} ∈   x m and  i is not 
dummy at  x at   . Now, we prove that   ≻  . By Theorem 1 , it is sufficient to 
prove that  D e i  ⊂ D e i  and  V e i  ⊂ V e i  for all  i ∈ N and that  D e j  ≠ D e j  . The 
last inequality follows from the fact that  x ∈ D e j  and  x ∉ D e j  . Then, we only have 
to show that  D e i  ⊂ D e i  and  V e i  ⊂ V e i  for all  i ∈ N. 
Assume  y ∈ D e i  . Then,  { i} ∈   y m , hence, by definition of   y m ,  { i} ∈   y m . Hence, 
y ∈ D e i  . 
Assume  y ∈ V e i  . Then,  i ∈  ∩ s∈  y m  s. Since  y ∈ V e i  , and  x ∈  ∩ i∈N ‾ V e i   holds, 
y ≠ x. Hence, by definition of   y m ,  j ∈  ∩ s∈  y m  s and  y ∈ V e i  .
Case 2: Assume that there exist  j ∈ N and  x ∈ K such that  x ∈  ‾ V e j   and 
 x ∉  ∪ i∈N D e i  . To define   set  s ′ =  ∩ s∈  x m  s and consider any  i ≠ j. Define the col-
lection of subsets of agents   i associated to  i as follows:
  T ∈   i if and only if i ∉  s ′ and T = { i, j} ∪  s ′ . 
Define now   by setting
  y m =  {   y m if y ≠ x{ s ∈   x m | j ∉ s}  ∪ { s\ { j} ⊂ N | s ∈   x m such that  j ∈ s} ∪ { { j}}  if y = x. 
  y m =  {   y m if y ≠ x {  i } i≠j  if y = x .
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Since  x ∈  ‾ V e j   ,  j ∉  s ′ . Therefore,   x m is minimal. Furthermore, as  x ∈  ‾ V e j 
and   is a voting by committees without dummies , there exists  s ⫋ N such that 
 j ∈ s ∈   x m . Therefore,  s ′ ⫋  N \ { j}. Hence,   x m ≠ { ∅ } and   is a well-defined vot-
ing by committees. Moreover,   y is a committee without dummies because   y is 
a committee without dummies at any  y ≠ x. Furthermore, by its definition,   x is 
a committee without dummies. Then,   is a voting by committees without dum-
mies. Now, we prove that   ≻  . By Theorem  1, it is sufficient to show that 
 D e i  ⊂ D e i  and  V e i  ⊂ V e i  for all  i ∈ N and that  V e j  ≠ V e j  . The last inequality 
follows from the fact that  x ∉ V e j  and  x ∈ V e j  . Hence, we only have to show that 
D e i  ⊂ D e i  and  V e i  ⊂ V e i  for all  i ∈ N. 
Assume  y ∈ D e i  . Then,  { i} ∈   y m and, since  x ∉  ∪ i∈N D e i  ,  y ≠ x. Hence, by 
the definition of   y m ,  { i} ∈   y m . Thus,  y ∈ D e i  . 
Assume  y ∈ V e i  and  y ≠ x . Hence, by the definition of   y m ,  y ∈ V e i  .
Now, assume  x ∈ V e i  . Then,  i ∈  ∩ s∈  x m  s =  s ′ . Then, by definition of 
  x m ,  x ∈ V e i  .
 ⇐ ) Assume (11) and (12) hold and let   :   n →  2 K be a voting by committees 
without dummies such that   ⪰  . By Theorem  1,  D e i  ⊂ D e i  and  V e i  ⊂ V e i  
for all  i ∈ N. We prove that  D e i  = D e i  and  V e  = V e i  for all  i ∈ N and hence,  ⊁  .
Assume there exist  j ∈ N and  x ∈ K such that  x ∈ D e j  \D e j  . By Remark 2, 
x ∈  ‾ V e j  \D e j  . Since  V e j  ⊂ V e j  ,  x ∈  ‾ V e j   \D e j  . By (11), there exists  i ≠ j 
such that  x ∈ V e i  . Thus,  x ∈ V e i  which contradicts that  x ∈ D e j  and  i ≠ j since 
i ∉ {  j} ∈   x m .
Now, assume there exist  j ∈ N and  x ∈ K such that  x ∈ V e j  \V e j  . Then, 
 x ∈  ‾ V e j   \ ‾ V e j  . By Remark 2,  x ∈  ‾ V e j   \D e j  . Since  D e i  ⊂ D e i  ,  x ∈  ‾ V e j   \D e j  . 
By (12), there exists  i ≠ j such that  x ∈ D e i  . Thus,  x ∈ D e i  which contradicts that 
x ∈ V e j  and  i ≠ j since  j ∉ { i} ∈   x m .  ∎ 
B. Anonymity
In this subsection, we restrict further the class of voting by committees without 
dummies by requiring that they are indeed anonymous (and, hence, no agent is 
dummy at any object). We show that the binary relation arising from our compara-
bility criterion endows the (quotient) set of anonymous voting by committees with 
a complete upper semilattice structure that we fully identify.
A social choice function  f :   ˆ  n →  2 K is anonymous if it is invariant with 
respect to the agents’ names; namely, for all  one-to-one  σ : N → N and all 
 P ∈   ˆ  n ,  f ( P 1 , … ,  P n ) = f ( P σ(1) , … ,  P σ(n) ). 
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REMARK 3: Let   :   n →  2 K be an anonymous voting by committees. Then, for 
all  x ∈ K ,   x does not have dummy agents.4
A voting by committees   :   n →  2 K is a voting by quotas if for each object 
x ∈ K there exists an integer  q x  between  1 and  n such that
   x = { s ⊂ N |  |s | ≥  q x  }. 
Observe that Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) call voting by quota to a vot-
ing by quotas that is in addition neutral in the sense that  q x  =  q y  for all  x, y ∈ K. 
The following remark states that the subclass of anonymous voting by committees 
coincides with all voting by quotas (not necessarily neutral).
REMARK 4: A voting by committees is anonymous if and only if it is voting by 
quotas.
Let   :   n →  2 K be a voting by quotas. Denote by  A 1  and  A n  the set of objects 
in  K that have quota  1 and quota  n, respectively; namely,  A 1  = { x ∈ K |  q x  = 1} 
and  A n  = { x ∈ K |  q x  = n}. Since for all voting by quotas   :   n →  2 K it holds 
that  D e i  =  A 1  and  V e i  =  A n  for all  i ∈ N, we obtain as a consequence of 
Theorem 1 the following Corollary.
COROLLARy 1: Let   :   n →  2 K and   :   n →  2 K be two voting by quotas. 
Then,   ≿   if and only if  A 1  ⊂  A 1  and  A n  ⊂  A n  . 
The next corollary identifies the class of anonymous voting by committees that 
do not admit a less manipulable anonymous voting by committees. This class is the 
family of all voting by quotas such that the quota of each object is either  1 or  n. 
COROLLARy 2: Let   :   n →  2 K be a voting by quotas. Then, there does not 
exist a voting by quotas (i.e., an anonymous voting by committees)   :   n →  2 K 
such that   ≻  if and only if  A n  = K \ A 1  . 
Let  VbQ be the family of all voting by quotas relative to a given set of agents  N . 
Using Theorem 1 we can partition the set of all voting by quotas  VbQ into equiv-
alence classes in such a way that each equivalence class contains voting by quo-
tas that are all equally manipulable. Denote the (quotient) set of those equivalence 
classes by  VbQ / ≈ . Furthermore, we can extend  ≿ on  VbQ to the set of equivalence 
classes  VbQ / ≈ in a natural way. Denote this extension by  [ ≿ ] . In this subsection 
we will show that the pair  (VbQ / ≈ , [ ≿ ] ) is a complete upper semilattice; namely, 
any nonempty subset of equivalence classes in  VbQ / ≈ has a supremum according 
4 To see that, assume  i is dummy at  x. Then, by anonymity,  j must be dummy at  x for all  j ∈ N . Hence,   x = { ∅ } 
which is a contradiction.
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to  [ ≿ ] . Formally, given   ∈ VbQ, denote by  [ ] the equivalence class of   with 
respect to  ≈ ; i.e.,
  [ ] = {  ∈ VbQ |  ≈  }. 
By Corollary 1,  [ ] can be identified with the pair  ( A 1  ,  A n  ). Denote by  VbQ / ≈ 
the set of all equivalence classes induced by  ≈ on  VbQ and consider the binary 
relation  [ ≿ ] on  VbQ / ≈ defined as follows. For any pair  [ ] ,[ ] ∈ VbQ / ≈ , set 
[ ] [ ≿ ] [ ] if and only if   ≿ . Since ≿ is a preorder on  VbQ, it follows that  [ ≿ ] 
is a partial order on  VbQ / ≈. Furthermore, by Corollary 1 ,
  [ ] [ ≿ ] [ ] if and only if  A 1  ⊂  A 1  and  A n  ⊂  A n  . 
We can now state and prove the main result of this subsection.
PROPOSITION 3: Assume  n ≥ 3. Then, the pair  (VbQ / ≈, [ ≿ ] ) is a complete 
upper semilattice.
PROOF:
Let  { ∅ } ≠ Z ⊆ VbQ / ≈ . Consider any voting by quotas   :   n →  2 K such that
  A 1  =  ∩ []∈Z  A 1  ,   A n  =  ∩ []∈Z  A n  ,  
and for all  x ∉  A 1  ∪  A n  (if any) set  q x  equal to any integer other than  1 and  n (which 
exists because  n ≥ 3 ). Since  A 1  ∩  A n  = { ∅ } for all  [ ] ∈ Z,   is well defined as 
a voting by quotas. By Corollary 1 and the definition of  [ ] ,  sup [≿]  Z = [ ] . Thus, (VbQ / ≈, [ ≿ ] ) is a complete upper semilattice.  ∎ 
Example 2 and Figure 5 show, for any  n ≥ 3 , the complete upper semilattice 
structure of  (VbQ / ≈, [ ≿ ] ) when  |K| = 3. 
Example 2: Assume  n ≥ 3 and let  K = { x, y, z} be the set of objects. Given 
[ ] ∈ VbQ / ≈ , we identify the equivalence class  [ ] by the pair  ( A 1  ,  A n  ) and 
furthermore, we denote  { x} by  x,  { x, y} by  xy , and  { x, y, z} by  xyz, and similarly for 
{ y}, { z}, { x, z}, and  { y, z} (and  { ∅ } by  ∅ ). By Proposition 3, the set of equivalence 
classes of voting by quotas is a complete upper semilattice. Figure 5 represents this 
partial order where if two pairs  ( A 1  ,  A n  ) and  ( A 1  ,  A n  ) are directly connected, the 
one above is more manipulable than the one below and moreover, all connections 
that can be obtained by transitivity are omitted. 
V. Comparing All Voting by Committees
In this section, we state and prove the main result of the paper which identifies a 
set of conditions under which two voting by committees (with or without dummy 
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agents) are comparable according to their manipulability. But before doing so we 
state a remark and give a definition.
REMARK 5: Let   :   n →  2 K be a voting by committees and let  x ∈ K and  i ∈ N 
be such that  x ∈ D u i  . Then,  x ∈  ‾ V e i   and  x ∈  ‾ D e i   . 
We say that a voting by committees   :   n →  2 K is dictatorial if there exists 
i ∈ N such that for all  x ∈ K,   x m = { { i}}. Obviously, all dictatorial voting by com-
mittees are  strategy-proof in any domain and hence, they are less manipulable than 
any other voting by committees. Thus, it is not necessary to include them in the main 
result of the paper that we state below as Theorem 2.
THEOREM 2: Let   :   n →  2 K and   :   n →  2 K be two non-dictatorial voting 
by committees. Then,   ≿   if and only if for all  i ∈ N, 
(A)  D e i  ⊂ D e i  and V e i  ⊂ V e i  and D u i  ⊂ D u i  or
(B) (D e i  \D e i  ) ∪ (V e i  \V e i  ) = { x} =  ‾ D u i   or
(C)  ‾  D e i  ∩ V e i   = { x} = D u i  \D u i  . 
Before proving Theorem 2 we exhibit in Example 3 two voting by committees 




(xyz, ∅) (xy, z) (xz, y) (x, yz) (yz, x) (y, xz) (z, xy) (∅, xyz)
(xz, ∅) (x, z) (x, y) (yz, ∅) (y, z) (z, y) (∅, yz) (∅, xz) (∅, xy)(y, x) (z, x)
(y, ∅) (z, ∅) (∅,z) (∅, y) (∅, x)
Figure 5
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Example 3: Let  N = { 1, 2, 3} be the set of agents and  K = { x, y, z} the set of 
objects. Consider two voting by committees   and   defined by the following (min-
imal) committees:
   x m = { { 1, 2}, { 3}},   x m = { { 3}},
   y m = { { 1}, { 2}},   y m = { { 1}, { 2, 3}},
   z m = { { 3}},   z m = { { 3}}. 
We consider the decisive, vetoer, and dummy sets of objects for each of the three 
agents separately.
For agent 1,  D e 1  = D e 1  = { y},  V e 1  = V e 1  = { ∅ } ,  D u 1  = { z} , and  D u 1  = { x, z}. Thus,
  D e 1  = D e 1  and V e 1  = V e 1  and D u 1  ⊂ D u 1  , 
which means that condition (A) holds for agent 1. Observe that conditions (B) and 
(C) do not hold for agent 1 since  ‾ D u 1   = { y} and  (D e 1  \D e 1  ) ∪ (V e 1  \V e 1  ) 
= { ∅ } , and  ‾  D e 1  ∩ V e 1   = K , respectively.
For agent 2,  D e 2  = { y},  D e 2  = { ∅ },  V e 2  = V e 2  = { ∅ } ,  D u 2  = { z} , and 
 D u 2  = { x, z}. Hence,  D e 2  \D e 2  = { y}, V e 2  \V e 2  = { ∅ } , and  ‾ D u 2   = { y}. Thus,
  (D e 2  \D e 2  ) ∪ (V e 2  \V e 2  ) = { y} =  ‾ D u 2   , 
which means that condition (B) holds for agent 2. Observe that conditions (A) and 
(C) do not hold for agent 2 since  D e 2  ⊈  D e 2  , and  ‾  D e 2  ∩ V e 2   = K , respectively.
For agent 3,  D e 3  = D e 3  = { x, z},  V e 3  = { z},  V e 3  = { x, z} ,  D u 3  = { y} and 
 D u 3  = { ∅ }. Hence,  D e 3  ∩ V e 3  = { x, z} and  D u 3  \D u 3  = { y}. Thus,
  ‾  D e 3  ∩ V e 3   = { y} = D u 3  \D u 3  , 
which means that condition (C) holds for agent 3. Observe that conditions (A) and 
(B) do not hold for agent 3 since  D u 3  ⊈  D u 3  , and  ‾ D u 3   = K , respectively.
Thus, by Theorem 2,   ≿  . Moreover,  D u 1  \D u 1  = { x},  ‾ D u 1  = { x, y} , and 
 ‾  D e 1  ∩ V e 1  = { x, y, z}. Hence, by Theorem 2,   ≿  does not hold. Thus,   ≻  .
We next exhibit a preference  P 1 such that  P 1 ∈   1  but  P 1 ∉   1  . Let  P 1 be the 
following preference:
  { y} P 1 { x, y, z} P 1 { y, z} P 1 { y, x} P 1 { ∅ } P 1 { x} P 1 { z} P 1 { x, z}. 
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Let  ( P 1 ′ ,  P 2 ′ ,  P 3 ′ ) ∈   3 be any preference profile with the property that  t( P 1 ′ ) = { x, y}, 
t( P 2 ′ ) = { x} , and  t( P 3 ′ ) = { z} . Then,
  ( P 1 ′ ,  P 2 ′ ,  P 3 ′ ) = { x, y, z} P 1 { y, z} = ( P 1 ,  P 2 ′ ,  P 3 ′ ) 
and, hence,  P 1 ∈   1 . On the other hand, consider any arbitrary preference profile 
 ( P 1 ∗,  P 2 ,  P 3 ) ∈   3 . Then, for some (potentially empty subset)  A ⊂ K \ { y}, 
  ( P 1 ,  P 2 ,  P 3 ) = { y} ∪ A and A ⊂ ( P 1 ∗,  P 2 ,  P 3 ) ⊂ { y} ∪ A. 
Hence, by the definition of  P 1 , 
  ( P 1 ,  P 2 ,  P 3 ) r 1 ( P 1 ∗,  P 2 ,  P 3 ). 
Thus,  P 1 ∉   1  . 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
 ⇐ ) To prove sufficiency, fix  i ∈ N and assume that  P i ∈   i  . We want to show 
that  P i ∈   i  . By Lemma 4, there exist  A ∈  o  ( P i ) ,  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i   , and 
T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i   such that
(14)  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 P i  A. 
We distinguish among three cases, depending on whether (A), (B), or (C) holds.
Case 1: Suppose that (A) holds; namely,  D e i  ⊂ D e i  ,  V e i  ⊂ V e i  , and 
 D u i  ⊂ D u i  . Hence,
(15)  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i  and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i  . 
By Lemma 2,  A ∈  o  ( P i ). By (14), (15), and Lemma 4,  P i ∈   i  . 
Case 2: Suppose that (B) holds; namely,  (D e i  \D e i  ) ∪ (V e i  \V e i  ) = { x} 
=  ‾ D u i   . Since  x ∈ (D e i  \D e i  ) ∪ (V e i  \V e i  ), either  x ∈ D e i  or  x ∈ V e i  . By 
Remark 5,  x ∈  ‾ D u i  . Hence,
(16)  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i  and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i  . 
By (14), (16), and Lemma 4, it is sufficient to show that  A ∈  o  ( P i ) ; or equivalently, 
by Lemma 2, that  t( P i ) ∩ D e i  ⊂ A and  A ⊂ t( P i ) ∪  ‾ V e i  . We distinguish between 
two subcases.
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Case 2.1: Suppose  x ∉ t( P i ). Then, since  D e i  \D e i  ⊂ { x},  t( P i ) ∩ D e i  
⊂ t( P i ) ∩ D e i  holds. By assumption,  A ∈  o  ( P i ) . Hence,  t( P i ) ∩ D e i  ⊂ A . Thus,
(17)  t( P i ) ∩ D e i  ⊂ A. 
Since  x ∉ t( P i ) and  ‾ D u i   = { x} hold, we have that  t( P i ) ∩  ‾ D u i   = { ∅ } and 
 ‾ t( P i ) ∩  ‾ D u i   = { x} . Moreover, since  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i   ,  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A 
∩  ‾ D u i   , and (14) hold, we have that  T 1 = { ∅ } and  T 2 = { x} hold as well. Since 
T 2 ⊂  _ A ,  x ∉ A . Hence, since  A ∈  o  ( P i ),  A ⊂ t( P i ) ∪ ( ‾ V e i   \ { x}) . But by the 
hypothesis that  V e i  \V e i  ⊂ { x} , we have
(18)  A ⊂ t( P i ) ∪  ‾ V e i  . 
Case 2.2: Suppose  x ∈ t( P i ). Then, since  ‾ D u i   = { x} ,  t( P i ) ∩  ‾ D u i   = { x} 
and  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  ‾ D u i   = { ∅ }. Since  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i   ,  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i   , 
and (14) hold, we have that  T 1 = { x} and  T 2 = { ∅ } hold as well. Since  T 1 ⊂ A , 
x ∈ A. Hence, since  A ∈  o  ( P i ),  (t( P i ) ∩ D e i  ) ∪ { x} ⊂ A. But by the hypothesis 
that  D e i  \D e i  ⊂ { x} , we have
(19)  t( P i ) ∩ D e i  ⊂ A. 
Since  V e i  \V e i  ⊂ { x} and  x ∈ t( P i ) ,  t( P i ) ∪  ‾ V e i   ⊂ t( P i ) ∪  ‾ V e i  . Furthermore, 
since  A ∈  o  ( P i ),  A ⊂ t( P i ) ∪  ‾ V e i   . Thus,
(20)  A ⊂ t( P i ) ∪  ‾ V e i  . 
Case 3: Suppose that (C) holds; namely,  ‾  D e i  ∩ V e i   = { x} = D u i  \D u i  . 
Since  x ∈ D u i  , by Remark 5,  x ∈  ‾ V e i  and  x ∈  ‾ D e i  . Hence,
(21)  D e i  ⊂ K \ { x} =  
 D e i  ∩ V e i   = D e i  ∩ V e i  ⊂ D e i  and 
 (22)  ‾ V e i   ⊂  ‾ D e i   ∪  ‾ V e i   =  ‾ D e i  ∩ V e i   = { x} ⊂  ‾ V e i  . 
By Lemma 3, (21), and (22),  o  ( P i ) ⊂  o  ( P i ). Hence, and since  A ∈  o  ( P i ) , 
 A ∈  o  ( P i ) . We want to prove that  P i ∈   i  . By Lemma 4 and (14), it is sufficient 
to show that
(23)  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i  and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i  
hold. We distinguish between two subcases.
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Case 3.1: Suppose  x ∈ t( P i ). As (C) holds,  ‾ V e i   ⊂ { x} and  K\ { x} ⊂ D e i  . 
Hence, by Lemma 2,  o  ( P i ) ⊂ { t( P i )\ { x}, t( P i )} . By (14),  A = t( P i )\ { x}. Then, 
since  x ∉ A and  x ∈ t( P i ) ,  x ∉  T 1 and  x ∉  T 2 hold, respectively. Hence, and since 
T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i   ,  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i   , and  D u i  \D u i  = { x} hold, we 
have that  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i  and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i  hold as well.
Case 3.2: Suppose  x ∉ t( P i ). As (C) holds,  ‾ V e i   ⊂ { x} and  K\ { x} ⊂ D e i  . 
Hence, by Lemma 2,  o  ( P i ) ⊂ { t( P i ), t( P i ) ∪ { x}} . By (14),  A = t( P i ) ∪ { x}. Then, 
since  x ∉ t( P i ) and  x ∈ A ,  x ∉  T 1 and  x ∉  T 2 hold, respectively. Hence, and since 
T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i   ,  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i   , and  D u i  \D u i  = { x} hold, we 
have that  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i  and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i  hold as well.
 ⇒ ) To prove necessity, assume   and   are non-dictatorial voting by commit-
tees and   ≿   ; i.e.,
(24)   i  ⊂   i  for all i ∈ N. 
Fix  i ∈ N and assume that (A) and (B) do not hold. We will show that (C) holds; i.e.,
  ‾  D e i  ∩ V e i   = { x} = D u i  \D u i  . 
Claim 1: If  |D u i  \D u i  | ≥ 2 and   ≿  , then  i is a dictator in  . 
PROOF OF CLAIM 1:
Assume  x ∈ D u i  \D u i  and suppose that there exists  y ∈ K such that  y ∉ D e i  . 
Since  |D u i  \D u i  | ≥ 2 , we can assume without loss of generality that  y ≠ x . Let 
P i ′ ∈  be any preference such that  t( P i ′ ) = { x, y} and satisfying in addition the 
following properties:
  (i) { x, y} P i ′{ y} P i ′{ ∅} P i ′{ x} P i ′A,
    for all A ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}},
 (ii) A r i ′B if B ∩ t( P i ′ ) ⊂ A ∩ t( P i ′ ) and A ∩  ‾ t( P i ′  ) ⊂ B ∩  ‾ t( P i ′ ) ,
    for all A, B ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}}. 
The preference  P i ′ can be seen as having two separate blocks. The first one orders the 
subsets  { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x} in a nonseparable way. All other subsets are dispreferred 
to each of these four subsets but, among those that are different to these four, any 
set  A that can be obtained from  B by adding objects in  t( P i ′ ) and deleting objects in 
 ‾ t( P i ′ ) is preferred to  B . Moreover, any pair of subsets of objects that are unrestricted 
by conditions (i) and (ii) can be ordered arbitrarily by  P i ′. 
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Since  y ∉ D e i  ,  { x} ∈  o  ( P i ′ ). Set  A = { x},  T 2 = { ∅ } , and  T 1 = { x}. Observe 
that  A ∈  o  ( P i ′ ) and, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′,  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { ∅ } P i ′{ x} = A. 
Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′ ∈   i  . Take now any  A ∈  o  ( P i ′ ). Let  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ′ ) ∩ A 
∩  ‾ D u i  and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ′ ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i  be arbitrary. We can assume that either 
T 1 ≠ { ∅ } or  T 2 ≠ { ∅} ; otherwise,  A = (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 and  A i i ′(A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 trivially. 
Since  x ∈ D u i  and  t( P i ′ ) = { x, y},  T 1 ⊂ { y} and  x, y ∉  T 2 . We distinguish between 
two cases.
Case 1.a: If  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} , then, by (i) and (ii) in the defini-
tion of  P i ′,  A r i ′(A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . 
Case 2.a: If  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} , then  T 2 = { ∅ } and  T 1 = { y}. 
Hence,  y ∈ A and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y}. Since  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} 
and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y}, either  A = { y} and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { ∅ } or else  A = { x, y} 
and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { x}. But then, and according to (i) in the definition of  P i ′, 
 A P i ′(A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 must hold.
Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′ ∉   i  in both cases. Thus,  P i ′ ∈   i  \   i  , which con-
tradicts that   ≿  . Therefore, we cannot suppose that there exists  y ∈ K such that 
y ∉ D e i  . Thus,
(25)  D e i  = K. 
Now, suppose that there exists  y ∈ K such that  y ∈  ‾ V e i   . Since  x ∈ D u i  \D u i  and |D u i  \D u i  | ≥ 2 , we can assume without loss of generality that  y ≠ x . Let  P i ′′ ∈  
be any preference such that  t( P i ′′ ) = { x} and satisfying in addition the following 
properties:
  (i) { x} P i ′′ { ∅ } P i ′′ { y} P i ′′ { x, y} P i ′′ A,
     for all A ∉ { { x}, { ∅ }, { y}, { x, y}},
 (ii) A r i ′′ B if B ∩ t( P i ′′ ) ⊂ A ∩ t( P i ′′ ) and A ∩  ‾ t( P i ′′ ) ⊂ B ∩  ‾ t( P i ′′ ) ,
    for all A, B ∉ { { x}, { ∅ }, { y}, { x, y}}. 
The preference  P i ′′ can also be seen as having two separate blocks. The first one 
orders the subsets  { x}, { ∅ }, { y}, { x, y} in a nonseparable way. All other subsets are 
dispreferred to each of these four subsets but, among those that are different to these 
four, any set  A that can be obtained from  B by adding objects in  t( P i ′′ ) and deleting 
objects in  ‾ t( P i ′′ ) is preferred to  B . Moreover, any pair of subsets of objects that are 
unrestricted by conditions (i) and (ii) can be ordered arbitrarily by  P i ′′ . 
Since  y ∈  ‾ V e i   ,  { x, y} ∈  o  ( P i ′′ ). Set  A = { x, y},  T 1 = { x} , and  T 2 = { ∅ }. 
Observe that  A ∈  o  ( P i ′′ ) and, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′ ,  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 
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= { y} P i ′′ { x, y} = A. Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′′ ∈   i  . Take now any  A ∈  o  ( P i ′′ ). 
Let  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ′′ ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i  and  T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ′′ ) ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i  be arbitrary. We can 
assume that either  T 1 ≠ { ∅ } or  T 2 ≠ { ∅ } ; otherwise,  A = (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 and 
 A i i ′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 trivially. Since  x ∈ D u i  and  t( P i ′′ ) = { x},  T 1 = { ∅ } and  x ∉  T 2 . We 
distinguish between two cases.
Case 1.b: If  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∉ { { x}, { ∅ }, { y}, { x, y}} , then, by (i) and (ii) in the defini-
tion of  P i ′′ ,  A r i ′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . 
Case 2.b: If  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x}, { ∅ }, { y}, { x, y}} , then  T 2 ⊂ { x, y}. Since 
T 1 = { ∅ } ,  x ∉  T 2 , and  T 2 ≠ { ∅} ,  T 2 = { y} , and  y ∉ A. Then, either  A = {∅ } and 
 (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { y} or else  A = { x} and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { x, y}. But then, and accord-
ing to (i) in the definition of  P i ′′ ,  A P i ′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 must hold.
Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′′ ∉   i  in both cases. Thus,  P i ′′ ∈   i  \   i  , which con-
tradicts that   ≿  . Therefore, we can not suppose that there exists  y ∈ K such that 
y ∈  ‾ V e i   . Thus,
(26)  ‾ V e i   = { ∅ }. 
By (25) and (26),  i is a dictator in  . This finishes the proof of Claim 1.  ∎ 
By hypothesis,   is non dictatorial. By Claim 1,
  |D u i  \ D u i  | ≤ 1. 
We distinguish between two cases.
Case I: Suppose that  D u i  \D u i  = { x}. We want to show that  ‾  D e i  ∩ V e i   = { x}. 
As  x ∈ D u i  \ D u i  , applying the same argument than the one used in the proof of 
Claim 1, we can obtain that  ‾ D e i   ⊂ { x} and  ‾ V e i   ⊂ { x}. Therefore,
(27)  ‾ D e i  ∩ V e i   =  ‾ D e i   ∪  ‾ V e i   ⊂ { x}. 
Furthermore, since  i is not a dictator in   ,  ‾ D e i   ≠ { ∅ } or  ‾ V e i   ≠ { ∅ }. Hence, 
by (27),
  ‾ D e i  ∩ V e i   =  ‾ D e i   ∪  ‾ V e i   = { x} = D u i  \ D u i  . 
Case II: Suppose that  D u i  \ D u i  = { ∅ }. We will obtain a contradiction. Since (A) does not hold there exists  x ∈ K such that  x ∈ (D e i  \D e i  ) ∪ (V e i  \V e i  ). 
Claim 2:  ‾ D u i   = { x}. 
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PROOF OF CLAIM 2:
We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: Assume  x ∈ D e i  \D e i  and there exists  y ≠ x such that  y ∈  ‾ D u i   . Let 
P i ′′′ ∈  be any preference such that  t( P i ′′′ ) = { x, y} and satisfying in addition the 
following properties:
  (i) { x, y} P i ′′′ { x} P i ′′′ { ∅ } P i ′′′ { y} P i ′′′ A
    for all A ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}},
 (ii) A r i ′′′ B if B ∩ t( P i ′′′ ) ⊂ A ∩ t( P i ′′′ ) and A ∩  ‾ t( P i ′′′ )  ⊂ B ∩  ‾ t( P i ′′′ )  ,
     for all A, B ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}}. 
As previously the preference  P i ′′′ can also be seen as having two separate blocks (we omit the details).
Since  x ∈ D e i  \ D e i  ,  { y} ∈  o  ( P i ′′′ ). Set  A = { y},  T 2 = { ∅ } , and  T 1 = { y}. 
Observe that  A ∈  o  ( P i ′′′ ) and, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′′ ,  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { ∅ } P i ′′′ { y} = A. Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′′′ ∈   i  . Take now any  A ∈  o  ( P i ′′′ ). 
Since  x ∈ D e i  \D e i  and  x ∈ t( P i ′′′ ),  x ∈ A. Let  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ′′′ ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i  and 
 T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ′′′ )  ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i  be arbitrary. We can assume that either  T 1 ≠ { ∅ } or 
T 2 ≠ { ∅ } ; otherwise,  A = (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 and  A i i ′′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 trivially. Since  t( P i ′′′ ) = { x, y},  T 1 ⊂ { x, y} and  x, y ∉  T 2 . Now we will consider two subcases.
Case 1.1: If  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} , then by (i) and (ii) in the defini-
tion of  P i ′′′ ,  A r i ′′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . 
Case 1.2: If  (A\ T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} , then  T 2 = { ∅ } ; otherwise, 
if there exists  z ∈  T 2 \ { x, y} , then  z ∈ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 and therefore  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}}. Hence,  T 1 ≠ { ∅ } and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\  T 1 . We distinguish 
among three different subcases.
Case 1.2.1:  T 1 = { x}. Then,  x ∈ A and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { x}. Since  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { x}, either  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { y} and 
A = { x, y} or else  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { ∅ } and  A = { x} (since  x ∈ A ). But in both cases, 
by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′′ ,  A P i ′′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 .
Case 1.2.2:  T 1 = { y}. Then,  y ∈ A and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y}. Since  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y},  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { x} and 
A = { x, y} (since  x ∈ A ). But then, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′′ ,  A P i ′′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 .
Case 1.2.3:  T 1 = { x, y}. Then,  x, y ∈ A and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y, x}. Since 
 (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y, x},  (A\  T 1 ) ∪ 
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T 2 = { ∅ } and  A = { x, y} (since  x, y ∈ A ). But then, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′′ , 
 A P i ′′′ (A\ T 1 ) ∪  T 2 .
Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′′′ ∉   i  . Thus,  P i ′′′ ∈   i   \   i  holds, which contradicts 
that   ≿   .
Case 2: Assume  x ∈ V e i  \V e i  and there exists  y ≠ x such that  y ∈  ‾ D u i   . Let 
P i ′′′′ ∈ P be any preference such that  t( P i ′′′′ ) = { y} and satisfying in addition the 
following properties:
  (i) { y} P i ′′′′ { ∅ } P i ′′′′ { x} P i ′′′′ { x, y} P i ′′′′ A
    for all A ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}},
 (ii) A r i ′′′′ B if B ∩ t( P i ′′′′ ) ⊂ A ∩ t( P i ′′′′ ) and A ∩  ‾ t( P i ′′′′ )  ⊂ B ∩  ‾ t( P i ′′′′ )  ,
    for all A, B ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}}. 
As previously the non-separable preference  P i ′′′′ can also be seen as having two sep-
arate blocks (we omit the details).
Since  x ∈ V e i  \V e i  ,  { x, y} ∈  o  ( P i ′′′′ ). Set  A = { x, y},  T 1 = { y} , and  T 2 = { ∅ }. 
Observe that  A ∈  o  ( P i ′′′′ ) and, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′′′ ,  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { x} P i ′′′′ { x, y} = A. Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′′′′ ∈   i  . Take now any  A ∈  o  ( P i ′′′′ ). 
Since  x ∈ V e i  \V e i  and  x ∉ t( P i ′′′′ ),  x ∉ A. Let  T 1 ⊂ t( P i ′′′′ ) ∩ A ∩  ‾ D u i  and 
 T 2 ⊂  ‾ t( P i ′′′′ )  ∩  _ A ∩  ‾ D u i  be arbitrary. We can assume that either  T 1 ≠ { ∅ } or 
T 2 ≠ { ∅ } ; otherwise,  A = (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 and  A i i ′′′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 trivially. Since  t( P i ′′′′ ) = { y},  T 1 ⊂ { y} and  y ∉  T 2 . We distinguish between two subcases.
Case 2.1: If  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∉ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} , then by (i) and (ii) in the defini-
tion of  P i ′′′′ ,  A r i ′′′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 . 
Case 2.2: If  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} , then  T 2 ⊂ { x}. We distinguish 
among three different subcases.
Case 2.2.1:  T 1 = { ∅ } and  T 2 = { x}. Then,  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A ∪ { x}. Since 
 (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A ∪ { x}, either  (A\  T 1 ) ∪ 
T 2 = { x, y} and  A = { y} or else  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { x} and  A = { ∅ } (since  x ∉ A ). But 
then, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′′′ ,  A P i ′′′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 .
Case 2.2.2:  T 1 = { y} and  T 2 = { ∅ }. Then,  y ∈ A and  (A\ T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y}. 
Since  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y}, either  (A\  T 1 ) ∪ 
T 2 = { ∅ } and  A = { y} or else  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = { x} and  A = { y} (since  x ∉ A ). But 
then, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′′′ ,  A P i ′′′′ (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 .
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Case 2.2.3:  T 1 = { y} and  T 2 = { x}. Then,  y ∈ A and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y} ∪ { x}. 
Since  (A\ T 1 ) ∪  T 2 ∈ { { x, y}, { y}, { ∅ }, { x}} and  (A\  T 1 ) ∪  T 2 = A\ { y} ∪ { x},  (A\  T 1 ) ∪ 
T 2 = { x} and  A = { y} (since  x ∉ A ). But then, by (i) in the definition of  P i ′′′′ ,  A P i ′′′′ (A\ T 1 ) ∪  T 2 .
Hence, by Lemma 4,  P i ′′′′ ∉   i  . Thus,  P i ′′′′ ∈   i  \   i  holds, which contra-
dicts that   ≿  .
Therefore,  ‾ D u i   ⊂ { x} . Furthermore, and since we have assumed without loss of 
generality that  ‾ D u i   ≠ { ∅ } (see (3)) , 
(28)  ‾ D u i   = { x}. 
This finishes the proof of Claim 2.  ∎ 
Finally, assume there exists  y ≠ x such that  y ∈ (D e i  \D e i  ) ∪ (V e i  \V e i  ). By 
Claim 2,  ‾ D u i   = { y} which contradicts (28). Therefore,
  (D e i  \D e i  ) ∪ (V e i  \V e i  ) = { x} =  ‾ D u i   , 
which contradicts that (B) does not hold. Therefore, Case II is not possible.  ∎ 
VI. Final Remark
Before finishing the paper we want to relate our comparability criterion to two 
alternative criteria proposed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013). To present them in a 
more general setting let  X be a set of alternatives and now let   be the set of all 
strict preferences on  X . Following Pathak and Sönmez (2013) we say that the profile 
 P ∈   n is vulnerable under the social choice function  f :   n → X if  f is 
manipulable by some agent at  P ; i.e., there exist  i ∈ N and  P i ′ ∈  such that 
 f ( P i ′,  P −i ) P i f ( P i ,  P −i ). 
First, and following their definitions in Section I, a social choice function 
 f :   n → X is at least as manipulable as social choice function  g :   n → X accord-
ing to Pathak and Sönmez (referred to as at least as  Ps-manipulable as, and writ-
ten as  f  ⪰ Ps g ) if any profile that is vulnerable under  g is also vulnerable under 
 f ; i.e.,
•   if there exist  i ∈ N and  P i ′ ∈  such that  g( P i ′,  P −i ) P i g( P i ,  P −i ) , then there exist 
j ∈ N and  P j ′′ ∈  such that  f ( P j ′′ ,  P −j ) P j f ( P j ,  P −j ). 
Second, and following their definitions in Section II, a social choice function 
 f :   n → X is at least as strongly manipulable as social choice function  g :   n → X 
according to Pathak and Sönmez (referred to as at least as strongly  Ps-manipulable 
as, and written as  f  ⪰ sPs g ) if any profile that is vulnerable under  g it is also 
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 vulnerable under  f but the same agent manipulates both social choice functions at 
the profile; i.e.,5
•   if  there  exist   i ∈ N and  P i ′ ∈  such that  g( P i ′,  P −i ) P i g( P i ,  P −i ) , then there 
exists  P i ∗ ∈  such that  f ( P i ∗ ,  P −i ) P i f ( P i ,  P −i ). 
Proposition 4 relates the three comparability notions for  tops-only social 
choice functions that are  strategy-proof on a restricted and rich domain of pref-
erences. We say that a domain   ˆ of preferences on  X is rich if for for every  x ∈ X 
there exists  P i ∈   ˆ such that  t( P i ) = x. 
PROPOSITION 4: Let  f :   n → X and  g :   n → X be two  tops-only social choice 
functions. Assume  f and  g are  strategy-proof on   ˆ ⊊  , where   ˆ is rich. Then,
  f  ⪰ sPs g ⇒ f  ⪰ Ps g ⇒ f ⪰  g. 
PROOF:
The implication  f  ⪰ sPs g ⇒ f  ⪰ Ps g follows immediately from the two defi-
nitions. To show that the second implication holds as well, assume  f  ⪰ Ps g. Fix 
i ∈ N and let  P i ∈   i g . This means that there exists  ( P i ′,  P −i ) ∈   n such that 
 g( P i ′,  P −i ) P i g( P i ,  P −i ). Since  g is  tops-only and   ˆ is rich, we may assume that 
P −i ∈   ˆ n−1 . By assumption, there exist  j ∈ N and  P j ′′ ∈  such that
(29)  f ( P j ′′ ,  P −j ) P j f ( P j ,  P −j ). 
Assume  j ≠ i and consider any  P ˆ i ∈   ˆ such that  t( P ˆ i ) = t( P i ); since   ˆ is rich, 
at least one such preference exists. Set  P ˆ = ( P ˆ i ,  P −i ) ∈   ˆ n . Since  f is  tops-only, 
 f ( P ˆ ) = f ( P j ,  P −j ). By (29),  j can manipulate  f at a profile  P ˆ ∈   ˆ n , a contradiction 
with  strategy-proofness of  f on   ˆ ⊊  . Hence,  j = i . But then, by (29),  P i ∈   i f. 
Thus,  P i ∈   i f whenever  P i ∈   i g which implies that  f is at least as manipulable 
as  g.  ∎ 
Example 4 shows that the reverse of the second implication does not hold in 
our setting where  X =  2 K , and the social choice functions under consideration are 
voting by committees,  strategy-proof on the restricted and rich domain of separable 
preferences. Namely, there exist two voting by committees   and   such that   is 
at least as manipulable as   but   is not at least as  PS-manipulable as   (and, by 
Proposition 4 above,   is not at least as strongly  PS-manipulable as   ). In particu-
lar, Example 4 together with Proposition 4 show that our notion of being at least as 
manipulable as is different and strictly stronger than the two notions proposed by 
Pathak and Sönmez (2013).
5 Observe that the notions of at least as  Ps-manipulable as and at least as strongly  Ps-manipulable as are rela-
tive to the inclusion of the sets of vulnerable profiles of preferences, while our notion of at least as manipulable as 
is relative to the inclusion of the sets of manipulable individual preferences.
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Example 4: Let  N = { 1, 2, 3} be the set of agents and  K = { x, y, z} the set of 
objects. Consider the two voting by quota   and   defined by the following 
committees:
  
      x m =   y m =   z m  = { s ⊂ N :  |s| = 2},      x m =   y m =   z m = { s ⊂ N :  |s| = 1}.  
By Corollary 1,   ≻ . On the one hand, consider any profile  P = ( P 1 ,  P 2 ,  P 3 ) ∈   3 and any preference  P 3 ′ ∈  such that (i)  t( P i ) =  {z} for  i = 1, 2 , (ii)  t( P 3 ) =  {x} , and  {x, y, z}  P 3 {x, z} , and (iii)  t( P 3 ′ ) =  {x, y} . Therefore,  ( P 1 ,  P 2 ,  P 3 ′ ) 
=  {x, y, z}  P 3 {x, z} = (P) and hence,  P is vulnerable under   . Moreover,  (P) =  {z} and  P is not vulnerable under  . Thus,   is not at least as  PS-manipulable 
as   and hence, by Proposition 4,   is not at least as strongly  PS-manipulable 
as  . On the other hand, consider any profile  P ˆ = ( P ˆ 1 ,  P ˆ 2 ,  P ˆ 3 ) ∈   3 and any 
preference  P ˆ 3 ′ ∈  such that (i)  t( P ˆ 1 ) =  {x, z} ,  {x, y, z}  P ˆ 1 {y, z} , (ii)  t( P ˆ 2 ) =  {z} , 
(iii)  t( P ˆ 3 ) =  {y} and  {x, y, z}  P ˆ 3 {x, z}  P ˆ 3 {z} , and (iv)  t( P ˆ 3 ′ ) =  {x, z} . Therefore, 
( P ˆ ) =  {x, y, z} and  P ˆ is not vulnerable under  . Moreover,  ( P ˆ 1 ,  P ˆ 2 ,  P ˆ 3 ′ ) 
=  {x, z}  P ˆ 3 {z} = ( P ˆ ) and hence,  P ˆ is vulnerable under  . Thus,   is not at least 
as  PS-manipulable as   ; hence, by Proposition 4,   is not at least as strongly 
 PS-manipulable as   . Therefore,   and   are not comparable according to the two 
notions proposed by Pathak and Sönmez (2013). ∎
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